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I. INTRODUCTION
The ever-increasing number of loans' secured by real property em-
phasizes the importance of understanding the mortgage transaction, 2 the
mortgagee's remedies, and the mortgagor's rights. Although most mort-
1. Mortgage loans held by commercial banks in the United States totaled
21.5 billion dollars in 1956, 25.5 billion dollars in 1958, 28.8 billion dollars in 1960,
and 34.5 billion dollars in 1962. Mortgage loans made by savings and loan associa-
tions in the United States totaled 10.3 billion dollars in 1956, 12.2 billion dollars
in 1958, 14.3 billion dollars in 1960, 20.75 billion dollars in 1962, and 24.7 billion
dollars in 1963. Mortgage loans outstanding held by savings and loan associations
grew from 35.7 billion dollars in 1956 to 90.8 billion dollars in 1963. 50 FED.
RESERVE BULL. 373-74 (1964).
In 1971, 116,000 mortgages were foreclosed in the United States. 5 FED.
HOME LOAN BANK BOARDJ. 45 (1972). Many more potential foreclosures were
settled by deeds to mortgagees in lieu of foreclosure or in some other manner. No
data is available concerning arrangements other than foreclosure because the other
practices often will not indicate on the face of the documents that default has
occurred.
2. A mortgage of land involves a transfer by a debtor-mortgagor to a creditor-
mortgagee of an interest in real estate to secure performance of an obligation or
payment of a debt. See G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE
FINANCE LAW § 1.1, at 1 (1979). This Comment will use the terms "mortgage,"
309
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gagors expect to pay the debt when due, default does occur. Following
default, the mortgagee often forecloses by sale. Knowing that the foreclosure
sale will terminate his equitable right of redemption, 3 a mortgagor who can-
not exercise this right to pay the debt before foreclosure may wish to recover
the property after foreclosure. At least two remedies may facilitate recovery.
One is to attack the propriety of the sale and to have it set aside. 4 The other
is to exercise the statutory right of redemption. 5 This Comment will explore
the latter remedy in Missouri, examining its history and current availabili-
ty. Although the statutory right of redemption has been available in Missouri
for over 100 years, practitioners may be unaware of its many nuances.
Because an understanding of the statutory right of redemption requires a
limited knowledge of the history of the mortgage, this Comment begins with
a brief, historical discussion of the mortgage.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE MORTGAGE AND REDEMPTION
When first developed as a security device, a mortgage represented a con-
veyance of the legal title to the mortgagee to secure payment of a debt or
performance of a duty by the mortgagor. 6 The mortgagor conveyed legal
"mortgagor," and "mortgagee," interchangeably with "deed of trust," "gran-
tor," and "beneficiary."
3. See notes 10-13 and accompanying text infra.
4. For an excellent discussion of methods to attack the propriety of a
foreclosure sale, see Dingus, Mortgages-Redemption After Foreclosure Sale in Missouri,
25 Mo. L. REV. 261 (1960).
5. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 443.410 -.440 (1978). The statutory right of redemp-
tion is also available in 25 other states. ALA. CODE §§ 6-5-230 to -246 (1975) (one
year); ALASKA STAT. §5935.210-.310, 945.190 (1973) (oneyear); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 12-1281 to -1289 (1982) (six months); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-440 to -444
(1979) (one year); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 725a (West 1980) (one year); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 38-39-101 to -106 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1980) (seventy-five days);
IDAHO CODE §§ 11-402 to -407 (1979) (one year); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 77, §5 18-27
(Smith-Hurd 1966 & Cum. Supp. 1981-1982) (one year); IND. CODE ANN. §
32-8-17-1 (Bums 1973) (one year); IOWA CODE % 628.1-.27 (1981) (one year); KY.
REV. STAT. § 426.220 (1972) (one year); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 6204 (1980)
(one year); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 600.3130, .3140, .3240 (1968 & Cum.
Supp. 1981-1982) (variable); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 580.23 (West um. Supp. 1981)
(generally six months); MONT. CODEANN. §§ 25-13-801 to -825, 71-1-228 to -231
(1981) (one year); NEV. REV. STAT. § 21.200-.250 (1979) (oneyear); N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 39-5-18 to -23 (1978) (nine months); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-19-18 (1976)
(one year); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 23.530-.570 (1979) (one year); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. % 21-52-1 to -32 (1979) (one year); TENN. CODEANN. §§ 64-801 to -805 (1976)
(two years); UTAH CODEANN. § 78-37-6 (1977) (six months); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, §§ 4528-4530 (1973) (six months); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 6.24.130-.200
(1963 & Cum. Supp. 1981) (generally one year); WYO. STAT. §§ 1-18-101 to -112
(1977) (generally three months).
6. H. SMITH & R. BOYER, SURVEY OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 338-39 (2d
[Vol. 47
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tide, however, on a condition subsequent. If the mortgagor paid the debt
or performed the duty when due, he automatically regained legal title. 7 Pay-
ment of the debt or performance of the duty was due on the "law day," and
default or tardiness in any aspect of the payment vested legal title in the mort-
gagee absolutely. 8 This practice afforded scant protection to the mortgagor
against forfeiture because of the rigid requirements of full and timely
payment. 9
To reduce the likelihood of unfair results, courts of equity developed
the equitable right of tardy redemption.' 0 Although the mortgagor no longer
ed. 1971). Originally, the mortgagee took possession of the land until the mortgage
was due. At that time, interest at any rate constituted usury and was unlawful. The
mortgagor used possession and the right to collect rents and profits to obtain a return
on the loan. Later, although the mortgagee retained the right to take possession,
the mortgagor usually would remain on the land. If the mortgagee did obtain posses-
sion, he was obligated to apply income from the property to reduce the mortgage
debt. G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 1.2, at 6.
7. G. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES 9 (2d ed. 1970).
8. Chaplin, The Stoy
, 
of Mortgage Law, 4 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9-10 (1890). See
also 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 16.178, at 427 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
The power to dispose of property is an incident of ownership. See RESTATE-
MENT OF PROPERTY § 10 (1936). A mortgagee, therefore, could convey alegal title
immediately after the law day if the debtor defaulted. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROP-
ERTY § 16.204, at 495 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
9. For example, if the mortgagor were ten minutes late in paying the amount,
title would become absolute in the mortgagee. The mortgagee could not recover
the property through subsequent performance of the obligation. Durfee & Dodd-
ridge, Redemption From Foreclosure Sale- The Uniform Mortgage Act, 23 MICH. L. REV.
825 (1925). For an example of the harsh results possible under common law redemp-
tion, see White v. Macarelli, 267 Mass. 596, 166 N.E. 734 (1929).
10. The equity of tardy redemption should not be confused with the statutory
right of redemption. The primary difference is that the equity of redemption has
no statutory basis; it was created by the courts of chancery to soften the harsh legal
consequences of default. Also, the equity of redemption arises prior to the sale and
is extinguished by the sale. Statutory redemption, on the other hand, derives its
existence from the appropriate statutes, Moss v. King, 212 Mo. 578, 584, 111 S.W.
589, 591 (1908), and it arises after the sale, MO. REV. STAT. §443.410(1978). The
differences between the two types of redemption are discussed more fully in Durfee
& Doddridge, supra note 9, at 836-37. See also Powers v. Andrews, 84 Ala. 289, 4
So. 263 (1887); Eiceman v. Finch, 79 Ind. 511 (1881); Spurgin v. Adamson, 62
Iowa 661, 18 N.W. 293 (1883); Eiceman v. Finch, 79 Ind. 511 (1881) Higgs v.
McDuffie, 81 Or. 256, 157 P. 794 (1916).
Missouri courts have never recognized the doctrine of strict foreclosure.
O'Fallon v. Clopton, 89 Mo. 284, 290, 1 S.W. 302, 303 (1886); Davis v. Holmes,
55 Mo. 349, 352 (1874). Missouri courts also have rejected the common law mort-
gage theory, under which the mortgagee received legal tide to the mortgaged land.
Missouri adheres to the principle that a mortgage of real estate is a lien to secure
a debt. It passes no estate to the mortgagee and creates no right to possession of
1982]
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had a legal right to his land following default, equity extended the time within
which he could pay the debt and regain the property." When equity first
recognized this right, it was unclear how long the mortgagor could delay
payment after the law day and still redeem.
To limit this seemingly limitless right to redeem, equity developed the
strict foreclosure proceeding. By using this proceeding, the mortgagee could
limit the time within which the mortgagor could redeem his property in
equity.12 Pursuant to the institution of foreclosure proceedings, equity would
order the mortgagor to pay the debt within a specified time. If he did not
pay within that time, he lost the right to redeem the land in equity. Since
default already had cost him the right to recover the land at law, nonpay-
ment in equity meant that the mortgagee received full legal and equitable
the property. See, e.g., Jackson v. Johnson, 248 Mo. 680, 698, 154 S.W. 759, 765
(1913); Pease v. Pilot Knob Iron Co., 49 Mo. 124, 128 (1871); Kline v. McElroy,
296 S.W.2d 664, 665 (Mo. App., K.C. 1957); Klika v. Wenzlick Real Estate Co.,
150 S.W.2d 18, 24 (Mo. App., St. L. 1941). See generally Comment, Real Estate Mort-
gage Theory in Missouri, 6 MO. L. REV. 200 (1941).
11. Equity courts created the "right of redemption," which has been defined
as "a right to have title to property which has been given as security restored free
and clear of the mortgage." 4 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 16.169, at 404 (A.
Casner ed. 1952).
12. In a mortgagee's suit for foreclosure of the mortgagor's equity of tardy
redemption, the chancellor usually would fix a first decree or a "short day" within
which the mortgagor had to redeem or be finally foreclosed. The actual time that
would elapse was anything but short since the ordinary slowness and cost of any
proceeding in chancery ensured that many months would elapse before equity
entered a decree. 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 335 (3d ed.
1938). This decree then ordered an accounting, which consumed more time. R.
COOTE, MORTGAGES § 1060 (9th ed. 1927). When the accounting was complete,
the mortgagor received, as a matter of course, six more months to redeem. Id. §
1061. Further extensions were available on some showing of cause. See generally
Ismoord v. Claypool, 1 Rep. Ch. 262 (1866-67) (extension granted without condi-
tions); Eyre v. Hanson, 2 Bear. 478 (1840) (extension on condition of payment of
amount due plus costs); Edwards v. Cunliffe, 1 Madd. 287 (1816) (mortgagor ob-
tained four extensions; fourth one granted even though court said third extension
was last).
When the redemption period expired, the mortgagee was entitled to a second,
or final, decree up to the entry of which the mortgagor still might redeem. Glenn,
A Study on Strict Foreclosure, 29 VA. L. REV. 519, 520,(1943). Even after the second
foreclosure decree, equity might reopen the proceedings and give the mortgagor
another opportunity to pay the debt. See generally Burgh v. Langton, 5 Br. P.C. 213,
15 Vin. Abr. 476, (1774) (decree absolute opened after 16 years). So great was the
protection of mortgagors that a decree might be reopened to divest title from the
mortgagee's purchaser. See Campbell v. Holyland, 7 Ch. D. 166 (1876). Because
of this practice, it was noted that "[Olne is not very safe in purchasing a foreclosed
estate ..... " F. MAITLAND, EQuITY 273 (1916).I
[Vol. 47
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title to the land. Strict foreclosure, however, did relieve the mortgagor from
further liability on the mortgage debt. 13
Although strict foreclosure is still available in some states, 14 most mort-
gages now are foreclosed by sale.15 The authorization for the sale can come
from two sources: a court, pursuant to ajudicial foreclosure, 16 or a deed of
trust, under a power of sale foreclosure. 7 Under either method, irregularities
in the foreclosure sale can void it."1 Since the statutes do not enable a court
to set aside an irregular sale, however, the mortgagor must set aside the sale
in equity. 19 If equity voids the sale, it is as if there had been no foreclosure;
the equitable right of tardy redemption is still available. 20
If the sale were conducted properly under a deed of trust's power of sale,
the mortgagor may be able to redeem his property through statutory redemp-
tion. In Missouri, statutory redemption is a distinct form of redemption,
supplemental to the other forms. 21 It represents an effort by the legislative
branch of government to protect the "helpless borrower against the sup-
posed greed of the money lender. 22 Basically, statutory redemption enables
a defaulting mortgagor to redeem the mortgaged property from the
13. G. OSBORNE, supra note 7, at 20.
14. Id. at 650-51.
15. Id. at 21.
16.
A typical action in equity... [forjudicial foreclosure] involves a long series
of steps: a preliminary title search to determine all parties in interest; fil-
ing of the foreclosure bill of complaint and lis pendens notice; service of
process; a hearing, usually by a master in chancery who then reports to
the court; the decree or judgment; notice of sale; actual sale and issuance
of certificate of sale; report of the sale; proceedings for determination of
the right to any surplus; possible redemptions from foreclosure sale; and
the entry of a decree for a deficiency.
Id. at 663.
17. See generally Dingus, supra note 4. See also Nelson, DeficiencyJudgments After
Real Estate Foreclosures In Missouri: Some Modest Proposals, 47 MO. L. REv. 151, 151
(1982); Note, The Debtor's Relie After Sale Under a Deed of Trust, 1950 WASH. U.L.Q.
617, 617.
18. The irregularities would include inadequacy of consideration, unusual
hour of sale, and purchase by the trustee at the foreclosure sale. See generally Dingus,
supra note 4.
19. See id. at 261-62.
20. Greene v. Spitzer, 343 Mo. 751, 123 S.W.2d 57 (1938).
21. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Federer, 315 S.W.2d 826, 829 (Mo. 1958); Oakey
v. Bond, 286 S.W. 27, 28 (Mo. 1926); Arnett v. Williams, 226 Mo. 109, 118, 125
S.W. 1154, 1157 (1910); Potter v. Schaffer, 209 Mo. 586, 597, 108 S.W. 60, 62
(1908).
22. Bridewell, The Effects of Defective Mortgage Laws on Home Financing, 5 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 545,545 (1938). SeeComment, StatutoyRedemption: TheEnemy
of Home Financing, 28 WASH. L. REV. 39, 39 (1953).
1982]
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mortgagee-purchaser within one year after a power of sale foreclosure. To
redeem, the mortgagor must pay a prescribed amount of money within one
year of the foreclosure sale.
III. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS TO THE CURRENT
MISSOURI STATUTE
The Missouri legislature created the statutory right of redemption in
1877.23 The statute provided that the grantor, his executor, administrator,
or assigns could redeem land sold under a power of sale within one year from
the date of the sale by paying the amount of the debt plus interest and costs.
24
To redeem the property, the proper party had to provide security "for the
payment of the interest to accrue after the sale, and for all damages and waste
that may be occasioned or permitted by the party whose property is sold.' '25
The 1877 statute remained in effect until 1917, when the legislature
amended the statute significantly.2 6 The 1917 statute is still in force today.27
The current law allows redemption by the grantor, his heirs, devisees, ex-
ecutor, administrator, grantees, or assigns .2 The primary differences be-
tween the 1877 statute and the current one are the addition of notice re-
quirements and the alteration of the security requirement. Under the 1917
amendments, the redemptioner must notify the trustee of his intent to
redeem.2 9 The security requirement was changed to require the redemp-
tioner to post bond with the circuit court in the circuit where the land is
located30 and to require the court to approve the security.
31
IV. STATUTORY REDEMPTION IN MISSOURI TODAY
A. Prerequisites to Redemption
In Missouri, the right of statutory redemption is available in limited cir-
cumstances. At least seven requirements must be met before the right arises:
(1) the sale must have been conducted under the power of sale in a deed of
trust,3 2 (2) the purchaser at the foreclosure sale must be the mortgagee or
someone on his behalf,3 3 (3) the redemptioner must be a proper party under
23. 1877 Mo. Laws 351.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. 1917 Mo. Laws 209-11.
27. See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 443.410-.440 (1978).
28. Id. § 443.410.
29. Id. See also note 79 infra.
30. Mo. REV. STAT. § 443.420 (1978).
31. Id. § 443.430.
32. Id. § 443.410. See also White v. Smith, 174 Mo. 186, 199, 73 S.W. 610,
612 (1910); Evans v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Go., 195 Mo. App. 438, 439,
192 S.W. 112, 114 (K.C. 1917). For a listing of the steps involved in a foreclosure
by judicial sale, see note 16 supra.
33. MO. REv. STAT. § 443.410 (1978).
[Vol. 47
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the statute,3 4 (4) before the sale, the redemptioner must notify the trustee
of his intent to redeem,3 5 (5) the redemptioner must post security for cer-
tain expenses with the circuit court where the land is located, 6 (6) he must
redeem within the proper time,3 7 and (7) he must tender the proper amount
to the mortgagee . 8 Each of these requirements is discussed below.
B. Statutory Redemption Only Available Following Power of Sale Foreclosure
Legislative history does not reveal why statutory redemption is
unavailable following foreclosure by judicial sale in Missouri. Legislatures
in most states have adopted statutes that allow redemption in either type
of foreclosure.3 9 In fact, California does not allow statutory redemption under
a power of sale. 40 One commentator has hypothesized that statutory redemp-
tion exists only after a power of sale foreclosure because, in a judicial
foreclosure, the court can protect the mortgagor. If a mortgagor gives a power
of sale to the mortgagee and authorizes the mortgagee to purchase at the
sale, it is the "mortgagor's own folly" ;41 he does not deserve protection.
C. Mortgagee Must Purchase at the Foreclosure Sale
The second requirement that must be met before a mortgagor may use
statutory redemption is that the holder of the debt must purchase the land
at the power of sale foreclosure. 42 If the purchaser is anyone other than the
mortgagee, 43 the mortgagor has no statutory right of redemption. 44 A com-
34. Id. 9 443.410.
35. Id.
36. Id. §443.420.
37. Id. 443.410 (one year).
38. Id.
39. G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 8.4, at 537.
40. Comment, The Statutogy Right of Redemption in California, 52 CALIF. L. REV.
846, 847 (1964).
41. Durfee & Doddrige, supra note 9, at 842 n.51.
42. MO. REV. STAT. § 443.410 (1978). See also Fitzpatrick v. Federer, 315
S.W.2d 826 (Mo. 1958); Euclid Terrace Corp. v. Golterman Enterprises, Inc., 327
S.W.2d 542 (Mo. App., St. L. 1959).
43. If the trustee purchases the property at the foreclosure sale, the sale may
be held to be voidable since the purchase is a violation of the trustee's fiduciary duty
of impartial fidelity. SeeJackson v. Klein, 320 S.W.2d 553, 556 (Mo. 1959); Gempp
v. Teiber, 173 S.W.2d 651, 653-54 (Mo. App., St. L. 1943). It has been argued
that the sale is void if the purchaser is the trustee. See Comment, Foreclosure By Power
of Sale Inserted In a Mortgage or Deed of Trust, 4 MO. L. REV. 186, 189 (1939). Never-
theless, the later cases do not support this proposition. Dingus, supra note 4, at
276-82. If the trustee purchases at the foreclosure sale, the sale may not extinguish
the equitable right of redemption. Jodd v. Lee, 256 Mo. 536, 540, 165 S.W. 991,
992 (1914); Sunny Brook Zinc & Lead Co. v. Metzler, 231 F. 304, 310 (S.D.N.Y.
1916), aff'd mem., 238 F. 1007 (2d Cir. 1917).
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mon problem with this requirement arises when a "strawman" 45 purchases
on behalf of the mortgagee. For example, in Loeb v. Dowling,46 a strawman
purchased the property for the mortgagee, but neither recorded the deed
until twenty-seven days after the sale. The mortgagor alleged that the pur-
pose of the delay was to deprive him of his statutory right of redemption.
47
Since the record might have revealed the relationship of the strawman to
the mortgagee, the mortgagor argued that concealment of this relation by
failure to record denied him the statutory right of redemption. Nonetheless,
the mortgagee's gambit was successful because the court ruled that the mort-
gagor had not posted a bond within twenty days following the sale as re-
quired by statute. 48 Therefore, the mortgagor had forfeited his statutory right
of redemption. 49 The Loeb holding presents an important lesson for mort-
gagors. The mortgagor who wishes to exercise the statutory right of redemp-
tion should not lose hope when a purchaser other than the mortgagee buys
at the sale. Instead, he should determine if the purchaser bought the land
on behalf of the mortgagee because, if so, he still may be able to redeem.
50
D. Who May Redeem?
Under the Missouri statute, the mortgagor, "his heirs, devisees, ex-
ecutors, administrators, grantees or assigns" have the exclusive right to
redeem.5 1 Lienholders junior to the foreclosed mortgage may not redeem. 52
By precluding junior lienholders from redeeming, Missouri has avoided some
particularly vexing problems concerning the rights between the mortgagor
and junior lienholders and among junior lienholders. 5 3 Illustrative of the
45. A "strawman" is one who holds naked legal title to property for the benefit
of another. See Houtz v. Hellman, 228 Mo. 655, 661, 128 S.W. 1001, 1003 (1910).
46. 349 Mo. 674, 162 S.W.2d 875 (1942).
47. Id. at 678, 162 S.W.2d at 878.
48. See generally notes 85-124 and accompanying text infra.
49. 349 Mo. at 680, 162 S.W.2d at 878. After denying the mortgagor's
statutory right of redemption, the court noted that he still could seek to set aside
the foreclosure sale in equity and thereby revive his equitable right of redemption. Id.
50. The mortgagor has the burden of showing that a purchaser bought the
property on behalf of the mortgagee. See Keith v. Browning, 139 Mo. 190, 196,
40 S.W. 764, 765 (1897).
51. Mo. REv. STAT. § 443.410 (1978). Somejurisdictions allow otherpersons
to redeem. For example, in Michigan, a lessee who is made a defendant in the
foreclosure action and whose lease has an unexpired term of three years may redeem.
MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.6062 (Cum. Supp. 1981-1982). A stranger to the
mortgagor's title may not exercise the statutory right of redemption. Feller v. Lee,
225 Mo. 319, 331; 124 S.W. 1129, 1132 (1910).
52. MO. REV. STAT. § 443.410 (1978). To protect his interest, the junior
lienholder must be able to buy at the foreclosure sale.
53. The redemption systems used by other states that allow junior lienholders
to redeem are interesting and complex. The "order" system provides for a period
during which only the mortgagor or his successors in interest may redeem, followed
[Vol. 47
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problems that can arise is the situation in Oregon. 54 Oregon statutes per-
mit the mortgagor and junior lienholders to redeem, but do not indicate who
has priority if all choose to redeem. 55 More than one person could claim he
is entitled to the land. 56 Neither the legislature nor the courts have resolved
this conflict.5
7
Although only certain parties initially may possess the statutory right
of redemption, the mortgagor may assign his right to a third party. 58 This
assignment can take two forms: conveyance of tide to the land 9 and transfer
of the right itself. 60 Missouri courts have not decided if the mortgagor re-
tains the right to redeem after conveying the property or the right of statutory
redemption to a third party before foreclosure. This issue is complicated
because the statute indicates that persons other than the grantor may
by a period during which creditors may redeem, followed by a period during which
the mortgagor or successors again have the sole right to redeem. See, e.g., IOWA
CODE § 628.3 (1981). Another system used by some states is the "priority system."
The senior lienor has a specified number of days to redeem after the right accrues,
followed by the same amount of time for redemption for the next senior lienor, un-
til all of the lienors have had an opportunity to redeem. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 580.24 (West Cum. Supp. 1981). The third system is known as "scramble redemp-
tion." A certain time is allowed for redemption by the mortgagor, his successor
in interest, or by ajunior lienor. Those entitled to redeem may do so from the pur-
chaser or from each other in any order. The scramble system protects creditors in
the order of their priority by requiring the mortgagor and the lienors junior to a
prior redemptioner to pay the amount of any senior liens held by the prior redemp-
tioner in addition to any other amounts due. When the mortgagor or his successor
in interest redeems, no further redemption is possible. The effect of the foreclosure
sale is terminated. The mortgagor, or his successor in interest, is returned to the
property. The unsatisfied junior liens reattach to the property. See, e.g., CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 703, 725a (West 1980).
54. See Comment, Oregon's Statutory Right of Redemption-Any Redeeming
Qualities?, 16 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 891, 896-98 (1980).
55. OR. REV. STAT. § 23.560(1) (1979) allows ajudgment debtor to redeem
and receive the deed for one year after the foreclosure sale. Id. § 23.530(2) allows
a lien creditor to redeem if 60 days pass without a subsequent redemption. The
creditor is entitled to the deed to the property, however. Id. § 23.600.
56. If the wording of these statutes is followed literally, the lien creditor as well
as the mortgagor could claim a right to the deed, if the lien creditor redeems after
the mortgagor and there are no subsequent redemptions for 60 days.
57. Comment, supra note 54, at 896-98.
58. Lapsleyv. Howard, 119 Mo. 489, 495, 24 S.W. 1020,1021 (1894). Some
states labeled the statutory right of redemption as a property right and have allowed
its transfer by statute. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 628.25 (1981).
59. In this case, the new holder of the title of the land becomes the mortgagor.
Lapsley v. Howard, 119 Mo. 489, 495, 24 S.W. 1020, 1021 (1894).
60. Leone v. Bear, 362 Mo. 464, 471, 241 S.W.2d 1008, 1013 (1951). See MO.
REV. STAT. § 443.410 (1978).
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redeem. 61 In California, the courts have construed a statute62 similar to
Missouri's statute to allow the mortgagor to redeem after he has conveyed
his interest in the property. In addition, the mortgagor may redeem, whether
he conveyed before or after the foreclosure sale. 63
Allowing the mortgagor to retain a statutory right of redemption follow-
ing conveyance of the mortgaged land has been criticized. Any redemption
by the original mortgagor necessarily inures to the benefit of the current
holder of the property since he would be the owner of legal title to the
property. 64 Allowing the mortgagor to redeem, therefore, is superfluous and
problematic; 65 only the current owner of the legal title should have the
statutory right of redemption.
Possibly because of Missouri Revised Statutes section 443.410,66 which
allows the "grantor in such mortgage deed of trust or his ... grantees or
assigns" to redeem, a second potential problem that Missouri courts have
not resolved is whether a mortgagor's grantee in a postforeclosure sale con-
veyance of the mortgaged land possesses the statutory right of redemption.
At least one Missouri court has suggested that a mortgagor's preforeclosure
sale grantee acquires the statutory right of redemption. In Lapsey v. Howard,67
the court noted that "one who acquires title subject to a deed of trust [i.e.,
before the foreclosure sale] has the same right to redeem'thereunder that
his grantor had.' '68 Because of the advantages to the mortgagee and the mort-
gagor, it would seem logical to extend the statutory right of redemption to
61. Mo. REV. STAT. § 443.410 (1978). In Missouri, the conveyance would
have to be before the foreclosure sale as a practical matter because the statute reads,
"[G]rantor in such mortgage deed of trust or his . .. grantees or assigns [may
redeem]." Id.
62. CAL. CIV. PROO. CODE § 701 (West 1980).
63. Yoakem v. Bower, 51 Cal. 539, 540 (1876). In Missouri, if the original
mortgagor conveys a life estate and retains a remainder under a deed, he may
redeem. Stevenson v. Edwards, 98 Mo. 622, 626, 12 S.W. 255, 256 (1889).
64. Once the original mortgagor transfers the property, he divests himself of
all title and cannot regain it by redemption. Huling v. Seccombe, 88 Cal. App.
238, 241,263 P. 362,363 (1928); Bateman v. Kellogg, 59 Cal. App. 464, 479, 211
P. 46, 53 (1922).
65. Call v. Thunderbird Mortgage Co., 58 Cal. 2d 542, 550, 375 P.2d 169,
173, 25 Cal. Rptr. 265, 269 (1962); Lawler v. Gleason, 130 Cal. App. 2d 390, 399,
279 P.2d 70, 76 (1955) (overruled in Thunderbird Mortgage on another point). In
Oregon, the judgment debtor's grantee who receives the property after the institu-
tion of the foreclosure suit but prior to the execution sale may redeem. OR. REV.
STAT. § 23.560(1) (1979). Thejudgment debtor also can redeem. Id. § 23.600. Thus,
under those statutes, debtors with deficiencyjudgments docketed against them may
redeem and receive a deed. The debtor's grantee may also argue that he is entitled
to the deed. Comment, supra note 54, at 893-95.
66. (1978).
67. 119 Mo. 489, 24 S.W. 1020 (1894).
68. Id. at 495, 24 S.W. at 1021.
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the mortgagor's postforeclosure sale grantee. For example, if the mortgagor
met all requirements for statutory redemption but could not pay the debt
within one year, he might wish to sell the land to recoup some of his mort-
gage payments. If the mortgagor's postforeclosure sale grantee could not
redeem, the mortgagor would be conveying an interest of little value. Allow-
ing the grantee to redeem, however, might enable the mortgagor to sell the
land and recoup some of his mortgage payments. Allowing the grantee to
redeem also would be advantageous for the mortgagee because he could
receive payments from the grantee under the terms of the deed of trust; if
the grantee remained solvent, the mortgagee might avoid a resale. The mort-
gagee also would avoid the inconvenience of managing the property. Several
jurisdictions have allowed the mortgagor's postforeclosure sale grantee to
redeem.69
Problems also may arise in ascertaining who may redeem land owned
by a husband and wife. For example, if property is titled solely in the name
of one spouse who subsequently dies, the surviving spouse succeeds to the
deceased spouse's interest and can redeem if there is "substantial com-
pliance" with the statutes.70 If both husband and wife executed the deed of
trust but the land is titled in the name of only one spouse, the spouse claim-
ing marital rights in the land also must substantially comply with the
statutes. 71 If one spouse mortgages property without the consent of the other
and the mortgage is subsequently foreclosed, the property still can be redeem-
ed in accordance with the statutes. If the time allowed for statutory redemp-
tion has elapsed and the spouse who mortgaged the property dies, the sur-
viving spouse still may be able to regain the property. Missouri Revised
Statutes section 474.15072 provides that any conveyance of real property by
one spouse without the consent of the other is presumed to be in fraud of
the marital rights of the surviving spouse. The surviving spouse then may
recover the property from the donee "and persons taking from him without
69. E.g., Call v. Thunderbird Mortgage Go., 58 Gal. 2d 542, 550, 375 P.2d
169, 173, 25 Cal. Rptr. 265, 268 (1962). Of course a successor in interest who
receives the deed after the statutory period of redemption has elapsed may not
redeem since the grantor had no right to redeem.
70. Moss v. Brandt, 216 Mo. 641, 656, 116 S.W. 503, 508 (1909). Missouri
abolished the common law doctrines of dower and curtesy in 1955. See MO. REV.
STAT. § 474.110 (1978).
71. In jurisdictions that still recognize the doctrines, the issue is whether they
are interests to which a statutory right of redemption attaches. In Iowa, the statutes
did not answer the question, but the courts ruled that when the owner of dower
did not join in the mortgage, she had no statutory right to redeem. The theory was
that the wife already had an absolute interest free of the encumbrance and, hence,





Devenney: Devenney: Statutory Redemption Following Power of Sale Foreclosure
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1982
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
adequate consideration." 73 The grantee may be able to prove that the con-
veyance was not in fraud of the surviving spouse's marital rights by show-
ing that he gave adequate consideration, but the grantee has the burden to
disprove fraud.74 Factors that the court considers in determining if the mort-
gage was in fraud of marital rights include the adequacy of consideration,
75
the proximity of the conveyance to the grantor-spouse's death, 76 and con-
cealment of the mortgage by the mortgagor. 77
E. Notice of Intent to Redeem
Anyone wishing to redeem property under the statute must give writ-
ten notice to "the person making or who is to make the sale" of his intent
to redeem if the mortgagee purchases at the sale. 78 The notice of an inten-
tion to redeem need not be given to the mortgagee; the statute only requires
the mortgagor to inform the person who will make the sale. 79 The person
wishing to redeem must give this notice within ten days before the sale or
at the sale itself.80 If the mortgagor does not give timely notice, he cannot
exercise the statutory right of redemption. 81 Dawson v. Hetzler8 2 exemplifies
the pitfalls of untimely notice. Because the mortgagor did not give timely
notice of his intent to redeem, the Dawson court refused to allow him to post
a redemption bond, and it dismissed the proceeding.83 The court noted,
73. Mo. REV. STAT. § 474.150 (1978).
74. Reinheimer v. Rhedans, 327 S.W.2d 823, 829 (Mo. 1959).
75. Nelson v. Nelson, 512 S.W.2d 455, 460 (Mo. App., K.C. 1974).
76. Edgar v. Fitzpatrick, 377 S.W. 314, 316-17 (Mo. En Banc 1964).
77. Nelson v. Nelson, 512 S.W.2d 455, 460 (Mo. App., K.C. 1974).
78. Mo.REV. STAT. §443.410(1978). Foraform that can be used to givenotice
of an intent to redeem, see Peterson & Eckhardt, Legal Forms, 7 MISSOURI PRAC-
TICE SERIES 5 1053 (1960).
79. MO. REV. STAT. 5 443.410 (1978). In Sheridan v. Nation, 159 Mo. 27,
59 S.W. 972 (1900), a case decided under the 1877 statute, the court promulgated
a more liberal rule. The court held that the mortgagor need not notify anyone as
long as he posted the appropriate security. "The grantor's right to... redeem from
a trustee's sale does not depend upon a notice of his intention to redeem. . . , but
upon his filing ... a satisfactory bond." Id. at 35, 59 S.W. at 974.
80. Mo. REV. STAT. § 443.410 (1978). Missouri courts have required strict
compliance with this requirement. See Fitzpatrick v. Federer, 315 S.W.2d 826, 829
(Mo. 1958); House v. Clarke, 187 S.W. 57, 60 (Mo. 1916); State ex rel. Gravois
Home Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Moss, 458 S.W.2d 593, 595 (Mo. App., St. L. 1970);
Dawson v. Hetzler, 230 Mo. App. 737, 739, 74 S.W.2d 488, 489 (St. L. 1934).
It has been postulated that if the mortgagor gives notice at that foreclosure sale,
the person making the sale must receive the notice before the hammer falls. Peter-
son & Eckhardt, supra note 78, § 1053, at 238.
81. Williams v. Safety Sur. & Loan Ass'n, 228 Mo. App. 135, 137, 38 S.W.2d
787, 789 (K.C. 1933).
82. 230 Mo. App. 737, 74 S.W.2d 488 (St. L. 1934).
83. Id. at 739, 74 S.W.2d at 489.
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"One can hardly read this statute without being impressed with its definite
and mandatory terms respecting the notice required.' '84
F. Redemption Bond
If the mortgagor gives proper and timely notice, his next step is to post
a bond within twenty days following the sale.85 He must persuade the cir-
cuit court of the county where the land is located that the bond is adequate
to secure the expenses as required by statute: interest on the mortgage debt
for one year before and after foreclosure, costs of the sale, encumbrances,
and taxes for the one year statutory redemption period.86
In Krahenmann v. Schulz,87 the court applied Missouri Revised Statutes
section 306488 and required the bond to cover taxes that accrued prior to
the foreclosure as well as taxes that accrued during the year allowed for
redemption. 89 The court noted that taxes arise "by operation of law subse-
quent to the giving of the mortgage.., and thus impair the security, unless
they are paid." 90 If the mortgagor were not required to include payment
of both taxes, the mortgagee would be liable for any unpaid taxes if the mort-
gagor did not redeem the property. The bond, therefore, must be sufficient
to secure payment of taxes.9'
Krahenmann also illustrates the statutory requirement that the bond cover
all interest accrued prior to the foreclosure sale on any prior encumbrance. 92
The court, in denying a motion for a rehearing, defined "prior encum-
brance" as any encumbrance existing prior to the mortgage. 93 As with un-
paid taxes, the accrued interest on a prior encumbrance could impair the
security.94
Not only must a party who is entitled to redeem under the statutes ex-
84. Id.
85. Mo. REV. STAT. § 443.420 (1978). For a form applicable to the filing of
the redemption bond, see Peterson & Eckhardt, supra note 78, § 1055.
86. Mo. REv. STAT. 5 443.420 (1978).
87. 233 Mo. App. 852, 109 S.W.2d 889 (St. L. 1937).
88. (1929) (current version at MO. REv. STAT. § 443.420 (1978)).
89. 233 Mo. App. at 856, 109 S.W.2d at 890.
90. Id. at 857-58, 109 S.W.2d at 891. The court, in its holding, stated:
It would seem, therefore, unreasonable that a mortgagor, in seeking to avail
hinself of his right to redeem, be allowed to prolong his possession, and
extend the time of payment of his mortgage debt as well, for a period of
one year, without giving security for the payment of taxes already accrued,
as well as for the payment of taxes accruing during such year.
Id. at 857, 109 S.W.2d at 890.
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ecute the bond, but "at least one good surety" must guarantee the bond.95
The courts have applied the latter requirement strictly. In State ex rel. Hanks
v. Seehorn,96 a corporation attempted to guarantee the bond. The company's
charter, however, did not enable it to become a surety on a bond. Since the
corporation lacked the power to become a surety, guaranteeing the bond
was ultra vires and, therefore, void. 97 Since the mortgagor could not redeem
unless the bond had at least one good surety and the corporation lacked the
power to become a surety, the mortgagor could not redeem. 98
The bond must comply with statutory requirements in form99 as well
as substance. For example, in State ex rel. MortgageAssociates, Inc. v. Rickhoff,100
the court disallowed redemption because the bond contained two defects.
First, it was not signed by the mortgagor, 10 and second, it was a "security
for costs" bond, which did not secure the items required in the statute. 10 2
The Rickhoff court ruled that because the mortgagor had not filed a proper
bond, the court lacked jurisdiction to hear redemption proceedings. 10 3
The bond must be filed within twenty days following the foreclosure
sale.104 Courts consistently have denied redemption when the mortgagor was
tardy in presenting the bond. 10 5
Application for approval of the bond must accompany the bond. 106 If
the mortgagee is a resident of the county where the land is located, the
redemptioner must notify the mortgagee at least one day before applying
for redemption. If the mortgagee is not a resident of the county where the
land is located or he cannot be found, the mortgagor must give the one day
notice to the trustee. 0 7 The circuit court then will either approve or reject
95. Mo. REV. STAT. § 443.420 (1978).
96. 227 Mo. App. 666, 55 S.W.2d 714 (K.C. 1932).
97. Id. at 668-69, 55 S.W.2d at 715.
98. Id.
99. See notes 85 & 86 and accompanying text supra.
100. 537 S.W.2d 872 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976).
101. Id. at 874.
102. Id.
103. Id. Similar results have been reached in other cases in which the form of
the bond did not exactly comply with the statute. See, e.g., State ex tel. Gravois Home
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Moss, 458 S.W.2d 593, 595 (Mo. App., St. L. 1970).
104. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 443.420-.430 (1978).
105. E.g., State ex tel. Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Bird, 232 Mo. App. 652,
653, 110 S.W.2d 386, 387 (K.C. 1937); State ex rel. Hanks v. Seehorn, 227 Mo.
App. 666, 669, 55 S.W.2d 714, 715 (K.C. 1932). If there is a defect in the bond,
the mortgagor cannot correct the error. See, e.g., State ex rel. Mortgage Assocs., Inc.
v. Rickhoff, 537 S.W.2d 872, 874 (Mo. App., St. L. 1976). Cf Hoppe v. Boerger,
116 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Mo. App., St. L. 1938) (mutual mistake, thus purchaser
entitled to reformation of instrument). See also State ex rel. Frank v. Administrator
of Frank, 51 Mo. 98, 100 (1872).
106. Mo. REV. STAT. § 443.430 (1978).
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the application. Requiring the mortgagor to give notice of the motion for
approval of the redemption bond protects the mortgagee by providing an
opportunity for the purchaser to be heard prior to approval of the bond.10 8
Compliance with this notice requirement is mandatory, and an ex parte hear-
ing approving the redemption bond is void. 10 9
If the circuit court is not in session when the application is made, the
court clerk will approve the bond temporarily, subject to later judicial
action. 10 The clerk must approve the application temporarily or the court
must consider the application within twenty days, or it will be deemed
rejected. 1" At any time during the one year redemption period, the court
may appoint a receiver to manage the property.1 2 The court also may re-
quire additional bond be given on application of the mortgagee after pro-
viding the bondsman with five days notice. 13
Missouri Revised Statutes section 443.440114 sets out the procedure
following approval of the application to redeem and subsequent inability
of the mortgagor to do so. After approval of the bond, the trustee, at the
mortgagee's request, executes a certificate of sale1 15 that refers to the deed
of trust, the sale, and the purchase, and delivers it to the mortgagee. If there
is no redemption, the trustee will give the mortgagee, his heirs, or devisees
good title by deed. 116 The rights, interests, or estates of any of the parties
may be conveyed as interests in land. Any prematurely executed trustee's
deed operates as a certificate of sale by the trustee. 117
If the mortgagor cannot redeem within the one year period, the point
at which the mortgagee receives full legal title to the property is unclear.
He may receive it when the trustee passes the certificate of sale to him at
the sale. Alternatively, he may receive it after the expiration of the redemption
year. Although the cases support both views, the latter rule appears to be
favored.I 8 Some commentators have argued persuasively that the purchaser
108. Id. An appeal from a denial of an irrevocable letter of credit as a redemp-
tion bond does not toll the one-year period for statutory redemption. Newton v.
Regional Inv. Co., 516 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Mo. App., K.C. 1974).
109. State ex rel. Goodenough v. Turpin, 487 S.W.2d 876, 877 (Mo. App., St.
L. 1972); White v. Huffman, 304 S.W.2d 909, 911 (Mo. App., St. L. 1957); State
ex rel. Hopkins v. Stemmons, 302 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Mo. App., Spr. 1957).





115. For an applicable form, see Peterson & Eckhardt, supra note 78, § 1056.
116. Leone v. Bear, 362 Mo. 464, 471, 241 S.W.2d 1008, 1013 (1951).
117. Mo. REV. STAT. § 443.440 (1978).
118. See Greene v. Spitzer, 343 Mo. 751, 760, 123 S.W.2d 57, 62 (1938) (dic-
tum) (implies that grantor retains legal title throughout redemption year); Safety
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Williams, 228 Mo. App. 595,598, 71 S.W.2d 848, 850 (K.G.
1934) (purchaser-beneficiary acquires legal title prior to end of redemption year).
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acquires legal title after the expiration of the redemption year, but then only
after the trustee issues the trustee's deed. 119 These commentators argue that
since section 443.440 requires the mortgagee-purchaser to request a trustee's
deed at the end of the one year period, the certificate of sale, which the trustee
issues at the sale, does not pass legal title. 120 In addition, the statute pro-
vides that the "rights, interests, and estates of any of the parties may be con-
veyed by deed as interests in land are conveyed." 121 This passage implies
that unlike the transfer of legal title, which normally is by deed, the transfer
of the interest the mortgagee-purchaser receives at the sale involves interests
not normally transferred by deed. Hence, the mortgagee-purchaser does not
receive legal tide at the sale. If the grantor does redeem, the mortgagee and
his grantee must give "a sufficient recordable acknowledgement of
redemption," 122 but the statute does not require the mortgagee-purchaser
to execute an instrument sufficient to reconvey legal title. If the grantor does
not redeem, the trustee must execute a "good and sufficient deed of
conveyance," 123 which is the first instrument of the transaction to convey
legal title. 124
G. Time Allowed for Redemption
The mortgagor has one year125 after the foreclosure sale to redeem.1
26
119. Peterson & Eckhardt, supra note 78, § 1052, at 236.
120. Id. at 236-37.
121. Mo. REv. STAT. § 443.440 (1978).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Peterson & Eckhardt, supra note 78, § 1052, at 236-37.
125. The length of redemption periods has been criticized because it deprives
the lending institution of revenue by delaying the time of payment. Bridewell, supra
note 22, at 558. This loss of immediate revenue will make it more difficult for others
to obtain land financing since less mortgage money will be available. Id. A second
argument for eliminating or shortening the time for redemption is that the longer
the period, the less attractive the property is to potential buyers. Comment, supra
note 22, at 40; Comment, supra note 54, at 903. The latter of these arguments does
not apply to statutory redemption in Missouri because the remedy is only available
when the mortgagee purchases at the foreclosure sale. Mo. REV. STAT. § 443.410
(1978).
At least ten states recently have shortened the length of time for redemption. Note,
Proposed Changes in Minnesota Law, 50 MINN. L. REV. 331,331 n.2 (1965); Note, Right
of Redemption of Real Property in Kansas, 10 WASHBURN L.J. 285, 295 (1970). The
average time allowed for redemption is six months. Prather, Foreclosure of the Secur-
ity Interest, U. ILL. L.F. 420, 453 (1957). This statistic was compiled before the ten
states shortened their redemption periods. Seven of those ten states chose a six-
month limit on the time available for statutory redemption. Note, 50 MINN. L.
REV., supra, at 331 n.2. A second alternative is the imposition of separate and distinct
redemption procedures for real property used for farming. See, e.g., WYO. STAT.
§ 1-18-103 (1977). The statute provides for a three-month redemption period for
[Vol. 47
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The courts have construed this time constraint strictly.127 Although the courts
recognize agreements by the parties to extend the time of redemption, 1 28
these agreements take the proceedings out of the statute and into the doc-
trine of equitable redemption. 129 Mortgagors also must use caution to avoid
laches.' 30 In Euclid Terrace Corp. v. Golterman Enterprises, Inc. ,131 the mort-
gagor's redemption bond had not been approved one year after the sale, but
the matter was pending on appeal. The mortgagor, however, did not pay
the amount necessary for redemption within the one year period. 3 2 Because
of this nonpayment, the court held that the mortgagor had forfeited his
statutory right of redemption.1 33
H. Amount Required to Redeem
In Missouri, a mortgagor who wishes to exercise the statutory right of
redemption must pay the amount of the debt, with interest, and other
specified items.1 34 The Missouri statute differs from most statutes, which
require the mortgagor to pay the amount of the foreclosure sale price. 135 The
latter type encourages bidders at the foreclosure sale to bid at least the amount
of the debt to protect themselves from redemption. 136 By indicating that a
most real property, but there is a nine-month period for farmland. It has been
postulated that the longer redemption was adopted because many mortgagors were
farmers, and if a crop failed in one year, making a default in payment inevitable,
the next year might bring a better harvest and allow the debtor to recover the land.
R. KRATOVIL, MODERN MORTGAGE LAW AND PRACTICE 333 (1972). Today
many mortgagors are still farmers, and this may be one reason why state legislatures
have enacted statutes providing for a longer redemption period for farmland than
for real property used for commercial, residential, or investment purposes.
126. Mo. REV. STAT. § 443.410 (1978).
127. E.g., Newton v. Regional Inv. Co., 516 S.W.2d 822, 823 (Mo. App.,
K.C. 1974).
128. See Turner v. Johnson, 95 Mo. 431, 446, 7 S.W. 570, 573 (1888); McNeer
v. Swaney, 50 Mo. 388, 390 (1872).
129. Mo. REV. STAT. § 443.410 (1978) (by implication).
130. See Turner v. Johnson, 95 Mo. 431,448, 7 S.W. 570, 573 (1888). In Turner,
the mortgagor and a second mortgagee agreed that the second mortgagee would
purchase the land under the mortgage and allow the mortgagor a "reasonable time"
to redeem. The mortgagor brought suit to redeem within three years and four
months after the sale. The court ruled that laches did not apply. Id.
131. 327 S.W.2d 542 (Mo. App., St. L. 1959).
132. Id. at 545.
133. Id. Some states have different time limits for exercising the statutory right
of redemption for different classes of creditors. See note 53 supra.
134. MO. REv. STAT. § 443.410 (1978).
135. G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 8.4, at 537;
Durfee & Doddridge, supra note 9, at 836.
136. G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 2, § 8.4, at 538;
Note, supra note 40, at 848.
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redemptioner must pay the amount of the debt, the Missouri statutes imply
that a mortgagor could not pay part of the debt and redeem a proportionate
share of the land. Missouri courts, however, have not decided if a mortgagor
could redeem, for example, one-half of a parcel by payment of one-half of
the debt. One court, however, has allowed apportionment when two separate
parcels of land secured the debt. 137 In that case, the court ruled that the mort-
gagor could redeem any one piece of real estate independently of the other. 138
I. Effects of Redemption
When the court approves the application and redemption bond, the
mortgagor remains in or regains possession of the property.139 If the mort-
gagor has committed waste, deductions from the redemption bond secure
reimbursement to the mortgagee.14 0
If the mortgagor redeems, the foreclosure sale is annulled, and the mort-
gagor is given full title to the land.' 4' A difficult question remains, however,
concerning the effect of redemption on the junior liens that existed prior to
foreclosure. The argument in favor of revival ofjunior liens is that they are
only suspended by the redemption process. In support of this position, two
commentators have argued, "Subsequent judgments which would have
created liens had there been no sale will create inchoate liens; and then, when
a redemption annuls the sale, these liens are revived. If there had been a
foreclosure sale without redemption, the liens would be extinguished." 42
If the purpose of redemption is to encourage adequate bidding at the sale,
liens should not revive because charged lands would become less salable. 4 3
Also, revival ofjunior liens might discouarge redemptions. A junior lienor
who wanted to protect his lien could buy at the foreclosure sale. The same
two commentators note that many redemptioners believe that the statute
has "conferred upon... [them] the privilege of buying out the purchaser,
npt a mere privilege of paying money for the advancement of others." 1 44
In Greene v. Spitzer,145 the Missouri Supreme Court stated, by way of dic-
137. Warren v. Ellison, 250 Ala. 484, 35 So. 2d 166 (1948). See also Ellickson
v. Dull, 34 Colo. App. 25, 521 P.2d 1282 (1974); Springer Corp. v. Kirkeby-Natus,
80 N.M. 206, 453 P.2d 376 (1969).
138. Warren v. Ellison, 250 Ala. 484, 487, 35 So. 2d 166, 168-69 (1948).
139. Hoppe v. Boerger, 116 S.W.2d 195, 199 (Mo. App., St. L. 1938).
140. Adkison v. Hannah, 475 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Mo. 1972) (removal of trees and
rug from property; mortgagor counterclaimed alleging conspiracy to destroy his
business). If the mortgagee sues for waste, the amount of damages is ajury ques-
tion. Id. Also, to recover for waste, the mortgagee must sue in a civil action separate
from the proceeding to approve the redemption bond. See Carter v. Guffey, 548
S.W.2d 233, 234-35 (Mo. App., K.C. 1977).
141. Mo. REV. STAT. § 443.410 (1978).
142. Durfee & Doddridge, supra note 9, at 850.
143. Id. at 851.
144. Id. at 852.
145. 243 Mo. 751, 123 S.W.2d 57 (1938).
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tum, that when real property is subject to two deeds of trust and the first
deed is foreclosed and sold at a trustee's sale, exercise of the statutory right
of redemption revives the second deed of trust. 146 The court reasoned that
after statutory redemption, the grantor "does not get new title to the prop-
erty, but his title is merely restored, freed from the ... lien [of the first deed
of trust, which was foreclosed] but subject to all other liens."1 47 In Missouri,
therefore, it would seem that statutory redemption does not extinguish debts
secured by liens junior to the foreclosed lien.
V. CONCLUSION
The efficacy of statutory redemption should be measured by how well
it furthers the policies behind the statutes. If a primary purpose for statutory
redemption is preventing the mortgagor from losing the equity he has in
the property, then the Missouri statutes do not fulfill their purpose. Because
the statutory right of redemption is available for only a few types of foreclosure
sales, few mortgagors can redeem foreclosed property. The inconvenience
caused the mortgagee by the statutory right to redeem must be balanced
against the hardship that the mortgagor might suffer without redemption.
Apparently the Missouri General Assembly in 1877 and, again, in 1917
balanced these factors and struck a middle ground. After seventy-five years,
the time may be ripe to broaden the availability of the statutory right of
redemption in Missouri.
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